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In this paper we discuss the results of research into the impact of foreign aid on human 
development. Rather than focussing on per capita income, as is common in the existing 
literature, we look at how aid impacts on a range of human development indicators, 
including measures, of health, education and fertility, and allow for the fact that these 
different dimensions of wellbeing are likely to interact with each other. Overall, aid is 
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1 Introduction 
The 2005 G8 summit in Scotland focussed attention on the commitment of the 
industrialized world to promoting economic/social development in Africa and other 
parts of the developing world. The debates about aid delivery took place in an 
atmosphere of scepticism about the benefits that foreign aid might bring. For example, 
at the time of the summit, many newspapers reported recent IMF research casting doubt 
at the effectiveness of aid expenditure.1 This pessimistic news contrasts strongly with 
some of the recent academic literature. The balance of evidence in the academic 
literature—which has not received a great deal of attention outside the academic 
community—is that, on average, aid does have some beneficial impact on human 
development (Addison et al. 2005; Clemens et al. 2004). This is not to say that aid will 
ever close the income gap between the northern and southern hemispheres, but rather 
that aid recipients experience better development outcomes, on average, than they 
would in the absence of aid.  
 
The research which the newspaper reports were publicizing illustrates some of the 
difficulties involved in researching aid effectiveness. First of all in producing robust 
estimates of the impact of aid on recipient countries, and secondly in communicating 
these results to a wider audience. In fact, there is a marked difference in tone between 
the newspaper reports above and the research paper they were quoting. This paper 
(Rajan and Subramanian 2005) actually states that ‘[a]id inflows do have systematic 
adverse effects on growth … in labour intensive and export sectors’, but that ‘[w]e have 
not established whether these adverse competitiveness effects offset any beneficial 
effects of aid’. They emphasize that ‘[a]id has to be spent really effectively so that the 
productivity improvements … offset any dampening effects from a fall in 
competitiveness’. As usual, the academic research is less categorical and more hedged 
with doubt. But what are the reasons for uncertainty in this case? Why can economists 
not work out how foreign aid affects the countries to which it is directed? There are two 
key problems.  
 
In the next section, we review the key difficulties in establishing empirical evidence on 





                                                 
1 With headlines such as ‘Aid will not boost growth, warns IMF’ (The Age, 04.07.05); ‘Aid will not lift 
growth in Africa, warns IMF’ (Financial Times, 29.06.05); and ‘IMF: Cash Alone Won’t Solve Africa’s 
Ills’ (Iran Daily, 02.07.05).    2
2  Why is it so difficult to determine the effects of aid? 
2.1  First problem: identification of the treatment effect  
Poor countries receive more aid (on average) than rich ones. A simple comparison of 
conditions in countries with aid to conditions in those without does not demonstrate the 
effect of aid. (Hospitals are full of sick people, but it does not mean that the hospitals 
made them sick.) To identify the effect of aid on an indicator of social or economic 
development, we need to find an instrument, a third variable that is independent of both, 
and that has a direct effect on aid only (not on the development indicator; this is an 
exclusion restriction). If our indicator varies systematically with this third variable, then 
we have demonstrated an aid effect, because, by assumption, the only way our indicator 
could have been affected is through aid.  
 
But this approach relies on assumptions about how the three variables are connected; no 
study can ever be 100 per cent watertight. Any results from the statistical analysis are 
predicated on the independence of the instrument and on the exclusion restriction. 
Therefore, all results about the effectiveness of aid are necessarily provisional. In many 
cases, it is possible to question the validity of the exclusion restriction. For example, 
Rajan and Subramanian use information about developing countries’ colonial ties as an 
instrument. The argument is the that former colonial powers are more inclined to give 
aid to their former colonies, so a developing country with a colonial tie to one of the 
relatively prosperous industrialized countries is likely to receive more aid, ceteris 
paribus. However, the exclusion restriction here can be questioned: colonial ties could 
also promote trade between the developing country and its former occupier, in which 
case aid is not the only route through which colonial ties impact on economic 
development. 
2.2  Second problem: how is ‘development’ to be measured? 
Aid might affect a wide variety of social and economic indicators. In order to identify 
the degree of aid effectiveness, we need to establish which indicators are important, and 
how the different indicators interact. A multivariate approach to the problem is a key to 
its solution, because there may be many virtuous spirals between different dimensions 
of development. It is unfortunate then that most papers examining aid effectiveness 
measure development only in terms of material wellbeing, specifically, in terms of 
average personal income in a region. In cross-country growth studies, the norm is to use 
PPP-adjusted per capita GDP or GNP.2 There are a number of reasons why PPP-
adjusted per capita income may be an unsatisfactory measure of material wellbeing. The 
price data on which PPP adjustments are based are collected only in certain countries 
and certain years. PPP adjustments for other countries and years, especially in the 
developing world, are based on extrapolations that may embody large measurement 
                                                 
2 See Summers and Heston (1991) for a description of PPP adjustment to national accounts data.   3
errors. Moreover, the prices used make little or no adjustment for variations in the 
quality of goods and services. Perhaps more importantly, many of the key goods and 
services that make a large difference to the utility of low-income households are 
consumed jointly by all the members of a single household. Examples include access to 
piped water and a flush lavatory, and the use of a refrigerator or radio. In this case per 
capita measures of prosperity may be less informative than measures based on assets per 
household. 
 
There already exist empirical studies relating to the connections between different 
dimensions of development, not just material wellbeing, but they typically focus on a 
single link in the chain. There are studies of the impact of a region’s education on its 
income (for example, Teulings and van Rens 2003), of income on education (for 
example, Fernandez and Rogerson 1997), of income on health (for example, Pritchett 
and Summers 1996), of health on income (for example, Bloom et al. 2004), of fertility 
on income (for example, Ahlburg 1996) and of income on fertility (for example, Strulik 
and Siddiqui 2002).3 Many of these studies present careful and compelling evidence on 
their chosen area of research, but taken as a whole they embody certain limitations. The 
heterogeneity of statistical methodologies and datasets across these papers means that 
they do not shed any collective light on the relative importance of the different causal 
links in the overall development process. It would be useful to know, for example, if 
any one link is particularly strong, and hence a potential focus for development policy 
and expenditure.  
 
Moreover, most existing cross-country studies use data on the average value of the 
development indicators in each country. The main aim of most empirical economic 
research has been to explain correlations in these indicators at the national level. 
Researchers in education and health sciences have often been more sensitive to the 
drawbacks of such an approach.4 They point out that using mean income places a large 
weight on the income of the rich, because income distributions are left-skewed, so the 
mean figure reported for a country is higher than the median. Looking at the link 
between variations in mean income and, say, variations in infant mortality might be 
misleading, because high infant mortality is a consequence of the poverty of middle- 
and low-income groups in a developing country. One way of addressing this problem 
might be to include a measure of income distribution in the empirical model; however, a 
more direct approach would be to measure separately the income and health status of 
the rich and poor within a country. 
                                                 
3 Briefly, the theoretical rationale for the effects is as follows. Higher standards of education and health 
embody human capital investments that increase productivity and so per capita income. Higher fertility 
entails a higher rate of population growth, and so a lower capital-labour ratio and (with decreasing returns 
to labour) lower productivity. Education and health are also normal consumption goods, so expenditure 
on them increases with per capita income. High fertility is a consequence of a low opportunity cost of 
labour (especially female labour), and is therefore decreasing in per capita income. 
4 See for example Dean Jamison’s comments at the IMF Economic Forum Health, Wealth and Welfare, 
15 April 2004 (www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2004/tr040415.htm).   4
3  A solution to these problems 
In this section we illustrate how one might go about dealing with the problems listed 
above, drawing on the methodology and results presented in Fielding et al. (2005). This 
methodology differs from existing work on aid effectiveness in several ways. Most 
importantly, it does not use GDP as a development indicator. No reference is made to 
per capita income. Instead, the model employs a measure of the material assets that the 
household possesses, using data on material assets in forty-eight countries in the World 
Bank Health, Nutrition and Poverty (HNP) database. These countries are listed in 
Table 1. The assets recorded in the survey are basic enough for differences in quality 
across countries not to be a major worry. This approach also avoids any reference to 
PPP adjustments.  
Table 1: Countries included in the analysis 
  Survey 
year    Survey 
year    Survey 
year    Survey 
year 
Bangladesh  2000 Dom.  Rep.  1996 Madagascar  1997 Paraguay  1990 
Benin  2001 Egypt  2000 Malawi  2000 Peru  2000 
Bolivia  1998 Ethiopia  2000 Mali  2001 Philippines 1998 
Brazil  1996 Gabon  2000 Mauritania  2001 Rwanda  2000 
Burkina  Faso  1999 Ghana  1998 Morocco  1992 S.  Africa  1998 
Cambodia  2000 Guatemala  1999 Mozambique  1997 Tanzania  1999 
Cameroon  1998 Guinea  1999 Namibia  2000 Togo  1998 
C.A.R.  1995 Haiti  2000 Nepal  2001 Uganda  2001 
Chad  1997 India  1999 Nicaragua  2001 Vietnam  2000 
Colombia  2000 Indonesia  1997 Niger  1998 Yemen  1997 
Comoros  1996 Jordan  1997 Nigeria  1990 Zambia  2002 
Cote  d'Ivoire  1994 Kenya  1998 Pakistan  1990 Zimbabwe  1999 
Source: Fielding et al. (2005). 
 
The household assets index is calculated by combining information about whether the 
household has the following material assets: a wooden or concrete floor, a radio, a 
television, electric power supply, a refrigerator or a car. The index is constructed for 
each household on a scale of zero to one, and then average figures are constructed for 
the 20 per cent of households ranked lowest by this measure, and for the four quintiles 
above them.5 The household-level information is aggregated to the quintile level, and 
                                                 
5 More details about data construction are available in Fielding and Torres (2005).   5
not used directly, because it is not possible to find reasonable exclusion restrictions at 
the household level. 
 
In addition to this measure of material wellbeing, the model also incorporates data 
measuring four other dimensions of development, namely, standards of sanitation, 
fertility, health and education. Sanitation is measured in two alternative ways: first, the 
proportion of households within each quintile with access to piped water, and second, 
the proportion of households within each quintile using a ‘bush latrine’.6 Fertility is 
measured by the average number of live births per adult female in each of the five 
quintiles.7 In measuring health, three alternatives are considered: the infant mortality 
rate; the child mortality rate; and life expectancy. Finally, education is measured by the 
proportion of adults in each quintile who have completed primary school. Appendix 1 
lists the sample means and standard deviations of these five variables. 
 
Illustrative statistics from Burkina Faso and Paraguay are presented in Tables 2 and 3. 
Burkina Faso represents one of the poorest countries in our sample All but the 
wealthiest households lack electricity, piped water and basic sanitation, and few have 
any education. Even many of the wealthiest lack basic facilities. In contrast, Paraguay 
represents a country at a further stage of development, with even the poorest households 
better off by some measures than the richest in Burkina Faso. Still, many of the poor in 
Paraguay lack sanitation and have higher fertility and infant mortality rates than the 
rich.  
 
Each of these dimensions of human development potentially has an impact on the 
others. Modelling all five simultaneously facilitates identification of the linkages that 
are quantitatively the most important, and also the most quantitatively important 
channels through which aid has an effect. Moreover, in measuring development for 
asset quintiles within a country, rather than just the average for the country as a whole, 
the model gives equal weight to the development outcomes of the rich and the poor 
within a country. 
 
All five development indicators are measured for each of the five quintiles in each of 
the 48 countries, so the dataset on which our estimates are based incorporates 240 
observations on each indicator. Observations in each country are made in a single year, 
as noted in Table 1, so our dataset is not a panel in the traditional sense. Using these 
data, it is possible to see how the variation in development outcomes in each quintile in 
                                                 
6 This is a euphemism for the complete absence of sanitary facilities. 
7 One alternative measure of fertility is live births per woman aged 40-49. This alternative is free of the 
right-censoring present in our measure (many younger women will not have completed their fertility 
when surveyed). However, it is also likely that fertility patterns will change across the generations, as 
socioeconomic conditions change, and in many of our countries fertility rates are high among teenage 
girls. In this case, restricting the fertility measurement to women past childbearing age will give us out-of-
date figures with a substantial measurement error.   6
each country is correlated with a range of independent social and economic 
characteristics. With exclusion restrictions on the way in which these characteristics 
affect development outcomes, it is possible to measure some of the interactions between 
the outcomes. With further restrictions, it is possible to measure the impact of aid on 
each outcome. Appendix 2 provides some detail about the structure of the fitted model; 
the discussion that follows is a non-technical summary of this model. 
Table 2: Illustrative statistics for Burkina Faso 
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Electricity  %  0 0 0 0 30 
Piped  water  %  0 0 1 4 55 
Using ‘bush latrine’ %  100  100  99  70  12 
Live  births  per  woman  7.2 6.9 6.8 7.0 4.5 
Under-five  mortality  %  24 25 22 23 16 
Primary  education  %  3 4 5 9 43 
Source: Fielding et al. (2005). 
Table 3: Illustrative statistics for Paraguay 
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Electricity %  1  10  37  96  100 
Piped  water  %  0 2 8 45  91 
Using ‘bush latrine’ %   2  2  1  0  0 
Live births per woman   7.9  6.3  4.3  3.9  2.7 
Under-five mortality %  6  5  6  4  2 
Primary education %  48  71  71  83  92 
Source: Fielding et al. (2005). 
 
A key part of the model is its identifying restrictions. Of the exogenous country 
characteristics that we allow for in our model of development, some might impact on all 
of our indicators. Among these characteristics are indicators of the countries’ colonial 
affiliation, a measure of ethnolinguistic fractionalization,8 and a dummy for countries in 
Africa. However, there are some restrictions that we can plausibly impose of the effects 
of other exogenous variables. These restrictions, summarised in Table 4, are as follows. 
Firstly, ethnolinguistic fractionalization and some of the geographical characteristics are 
unlikely to have a direct impact on anything other than material resources (measured by 
the assets index and sanitation) through an effect on factor productivity. These 
characteristics are country size and the value of the country’s natural resource wealth.  
 
                                                 
8 This measures the probability of two randomly selected individuals in a country speaking different 
native languages. High fractionalization might be associated with lower social cohesion, damaging 
development along many dimensions.   7
Table 4: Model structure 
Control variables  Appearing in the equations for 
dummy = 1 if in Africa  assets  sanitation education fertility  health 
dummy = 1 if colonized by Britain  assets  sanitation  education  fertility  health 
dummy = 1 if colonized by France  assets sanitation education fertility  health 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization index  assets  sanitation   
log country surface area  assets  sanitation 
log natural resource capital value  assets  sanitation 
 
dummy = 1 if country has coastline   assets  sanitation 
 
health 
fraction of the population Christian education  fertility 




temperature squared  health 




Source: Fielding et al. (2005). 
 
Similarly, other geographical characteristics are unlikely to have a direct impact on 
anything other than health. These characteristics are temperature9,10 and the fraction of 
the population living in areas at risk of malarial infection. Whether a country has a 
coastline might affect health and wealth, but it is unlikely to affect education or fertility 
directly, and so it can be excluded from the equations for these two indicators. These 
restrictions together allow us to identify the effects of material assets, sanitation and 
health in each of the other four equations, except that the effects of assets on sanitation 
and of sanitation on assets are unidentified. The effects of fertility and education in the 
assets, sanitation and health equations are identified by assuming that religious 
adherence, as captured by the fraction of the population adhering to Christianity or 
Islam, has no direct effect on assets and health.11 However, it might affect attitudes 
towards contraception or the value of education (especially female education), and so 
have a role in determining fertility and schooling. The other effects we do not attempt to 
identify—because of an absence of any obvious instrument—are of fertility in the 
education equation and of education in the fertility equation.  
 
                                                 
9 Temperature might affect the value of agricultural land and so factor productivity and material wealth, 
but we are already using natural resource wealth to control for the value of natural resources in the assets 
equation. 
10 Pitt and Sigle (1997) show that climatic shocks (specifically, shocks to rainfall) have a permanent 
impact on birth rates in rural Senegalese households. Their interpretation of this result is that a shock to 
rainfall represents a shock to permanent income. In this case, having conditioned fertility on household 
assets, we do not need a climate variable in our fertility equation. 
11 We rely on the assumption that religious affiliation will affect health only through its impact on 
education and fertility, and not in any other way.   8
The exclusion restriction that is used to identify the effect of aid on all the development 
indicators is that the dollar value of aid per capita (and no other variable in the model) 
depends on the country’s past ability to absorb development assistance. This is 
measured by the past ratio of aid actually disbursed to aid nominally committed to a 
country. 
 
In the following tables we summarise the results presented in Fielding et al. (2005) 
when child mortality as a measure of health and access to piped water as a measure of 
sanitation. In interpreting the results, two factors must be born in mind. First, the link 
between two development indicators, on average, can be positive or negative. Positive 
links will arise because human capacity in one dimension reinforces human capacity in 
another dimension. For example, well-educated people might be more economically 
productive, and therefore wealthier; moreover, wealthier people might have more time 
or money to spend on education.12 Negative links will arise when people have to make 
a choice about where to commit time or money. More spent on schooling might mean 
less spent on, for example, sanitation. (In the case of positive feedback, aid devoted to 
one development outcome will also benefit others indirectly. In the case of negative 
feedback, aid will be beneficial to the extent that it relaxes the household’s resource 
constraint.) We need not speculate about whether the positive or negative effect 
dominates for any given pair of development indicators: appropriate statistical analysis 
will reveal which is greater on average, or whether the two more or less cancel each 
other out. It turns out with our data that positive feedback effects dominate more often 
than negative ones, on average. For example, there are mutually reinforcing positive 
links between material wellbeing and education, between material wellbeing and lower 
child mortality, and between education and lower mortality. Nevertheless, there are a 
few negative links, in particular between education and sanitation. 
 
Second, we ought to distinguish between the direct effect of aid, on average, and the 
‘equilibrium’ effect. Imagine a 10 per cent increase in aid in a particular country. This 
may have several direct effects: improved sanitation, more education, lower child 
mortality, and so on. But this is not the end of the story: changes in one development 
outcome will then have knock-on effects on the others, on average. So the final effect of 
aid on development—the equilibrium effect—might be rather different from its direct 
effect. 
 
In interpreting our fitted model, we should remember that the results are conditional on 
the historical pattern of aid expenditure. The results show the impact of aid as it has 
typically been used in recent years. Our model is based on an aggregate measure of aid 
to each country, and we do not make use of aid figures disaggregated according to the 
type of development project for which they are intended. It is true that there is some 
                                                 
12 Some of these effects may occur with a substantial lag. With a cross-sectional dataset we do not have 
the opportunity to explore the dynamics of the interactions between the different development indicators.   9
variation in the proportions of aid intended for specific purposes. For example, the 
proportion of the total aid budget intended for education and health projects does vary 
somewhat from one country to another, as illustrated in Table 5 (in neither case is the 
average aid allocation to these sectors that large). However, there is not necessarily a 
simple correlation between the fraction of aid intended for a certain development 
outcome and the outcome actually observed. On the one hand, aid to a certain sector 
may stimulate more local investment in that sector (Gramlich 1969): evidence for this 
‘flypaper theory’ is discussed in Devarajan and Swaroop (1998). The magnitude of the 
flypaper effect may vary across sectors. On the other hand, aid is at least partially 
fungible (see for example Devarajan et al. 1998). That is, the aid to a particular sector 
leads to a reduction in local investment in the sector. Again, the magnitude of the effect 
may vary across sectors. 














Bangladesh  11.7  4.5  Ghana    7.8   5.9 Nicaragua    3.9    4.2
Benin  13.3  5.3  Guatemala    9.6 10.0 Niger    9.3    4.6
Bolivia    5.5  4.1  Guinea  12.5   4.1 Nigeria    8.6  13.6
Brazil  8.6  2.8  Haiti    9.4   9.7 Pakistan    3.0    2.6
Burkina Faso  11.4  4.6  India    7.4   6.9 Paraguay    6.6    3.7
Cambodia    7.9  8.1  Indonesia    5.8   2.5 Peru    3.2    4.1
Cameroon  11.3  2.1  Jordan    4.5   1.7 Philippines    4.5    2.3
C.A.R.  11.2  7.3  Kenya    6.7   9.7 Rwanda    6.0    6.3
Chad  11.0  7.9  Madagascar    8.2   3.4 S. Africa  17.7    5.5
Colombia    3.7  1.3  Malawi  13.0   9.0 Tanzania    7.0    9.2
Comoros 29.6  9.7  Mali  15.6   3.8 Togo  18.5    4.1
Cote d'Ivoire  7.1  2.8  Mauritania  12.0   2.9 Uganda  10.7    9.0
Dom. Rep.  8.1  8.7  Morocco  23.7   1.7 Viet Nam    5.0    2.6
Egypt    5.2  1.8  Mozambique    5.9   6.4 Yemen    9.6    4.0
Ethiopia    8.3  5.9  Namibia  16.9   4.3 Zambia  11.3    9.3
Gabon  16.9  2.5  Nepal  12.4   5.9 Zimbabwe    5.9    6.2
          
mean    9.9  5.4  std. dev.    5.3   2.9   
Source: Fielding et al. (2005). 
 
What does the statistical analysis actually show? First, we will summarise the direct and 
equilibrium effects of aid (on average), without saying anything about the sizes of the 
different effects. Then, in order to illustrate the magnitude of the impact of aid, we will 
again refer to two examples drawn from our sample: Burkina Faso and Paraguay. The 
direct effects of aid (on average) on our five development outcomes are in Table 6. In 
indicating the direct effects, it is important to distinguish between those that are 
‘statistically significant’ and those that are not. Roughly, this is a distinction between,   10
on the one hand, those characteristics of our data that are unlikely to have appeared at 
random, and on the other, those that could well be a ‘fluke’ telling us nothing about the 
likely effect of aid in countries and time periods outside our data. 
Table 6: Direct effects of aid on the development indicators 
Assets  positive and statistically significant 
Sanitation  positive and statistically significant 
Fertility  positive and statistically significant 
Child mortality  negative (more aid reduces mortality) and statistically significant 
Schooling statistically  insignificant (small but positive on average) 
Source: Fielding et al. (2005). 
 
Note that the direct effect of aid on fertility is positive. On average, the income stream 
that the aid represents encourages people to have more children. The equilibrium effects 
of aid are reported in Table 7. Here, it is important to remember that the effects of aid 
will vary across countries and across asset quintiles. How effective aid is depends on 
what level of development the households start off at. 
Table 7: Equilibrium effects of aid 
Assets always  positive 
Sanitation always  positive 
Fertility  mostly negative (that is, more aid reduces fertility) 
Child mortality  always negative (that is, more aid reduces mortality) 
Schooling  almost always positive 
Source: Fielding et al. (2005). 
 
Mostly, the direct effects of aid reinforce each other. Note that the equilibrium effect of 
aid on schooling is positive, even though the direct effect is small and statistically 
insignificant. This is because schooling responds positively to improvements in assets 
and child mortality. Note also that the equilibrium effect on fertility is mostly the 
reverse of its direct effect. The main reason for this seems to be that reductions in child 
mortality following an increase in aid reduce the number of births needed to achieve a 
family of a certain size. 
 
Tables 8 and 9 illustrate typical predicted equilibrium effects in our sample of countries. 
The numbers show, in percentage terms, the equilibrium effects of a doubling aid on 
each development outcome.13 In both Paraguay and Burkina Faso (as elsewhere), aid 
can be expected to improve the quality of life along several dimensions. However, it can 
be seen that there is some variation in the size of the effects between outcomes, between 
countries and between quintiles. Although there is a substantial general improvement in 
                                                 
13 In interpreting these figures, it is worth noting that the mean sample value of our aid variables is 0.103; 
the corresponding standard deviation is 0.080.   11
the quality of life with an increase in aid, the effects on child mortality are typically 
much larger than other effects. 
Table 8: Predicted growth, Burkina Faso 
  Q1% Q2% Q3% Q4% Q5%
Assets increase  1.0 1.6 2.5 3.5  10.1
Sanitation increase  0.4 2.0 5.6 8.0  26.5
Fertility reduction  -3.6 -2.5 -1.0 0.8  11.6
Under-five mortality reduction  7.6 9.7 3.1 6.6  37.6
Primary education increase  1.5 2.0 2.5 3.5  7.5
Source: Fielding et al. (2005). 
Table 9: Predicted growth, Paraguay 
  Q1% Q2% Q3% Q4% Q5%
Assets increase  9.4 9.5 7.6 4.5  1.7
Sanitation increase  27.6 25.7 27.4 16.6  2.3
Fertility reduction  13.2 14.0 4.2 1.5  -3.0
Under-five mortality reduction  34.6 40.4 27.0 21.6  8.9
Primary education increase  6.3 6.4 3.4 1.3  0.9
Source: Fielding et al. (2005). 
4 Conclusions 
The results thus summarized show a straightforwardly positive effect of aid on 
development outcomes. This contrasts with an existing literature in which there are 
mixed results about the impact of aid on per capita GDP. One reason for this contrast 
may be that the results above focus on the impact of aid on human development, and 
how aid might promote investment in human capital. By contrast, existing studies 
implicitly model the impact of aid on labour productivity,14 which will depend to a 
much greater degree on the extent to which aid promotes investment in physical capital. 
Moreover, any beneficial impact of aid on labour productivity could be offset by a 
Dutch Disease effect, as the inflow of foreign currency leads to a real exchange rate 
appreciation and a consequent reduction in export competitiveness. 
 
The beneficial effects of aid are partly a consequence of positive interactions between 
different aspects of human development. For example, while higher levels of aid do not 
appear to be directly associated with a substantial improvement in schooling, they are 
associated with much better health, and there are strong positive interactions between 
health and schooling. Aid appears to be important in improving health outcomes, 
                                                 
14 If the ratio of workers to non-workers in a population is constant, per capita GDP will be perfectly 
correlated with GDP per worker.   12
despite the fact that a relatively small fraction of aid budgets (about 5 per cent on 
average) is hypothecated to health expenditure. One potential explanation for this, 
meriting further research, is that there are relatively low fungibility and/or relatively 
large flypaper effects with aid to health. 
 
It may well be the case that the effectiveness of aid in improving labour productivity 
does depend to a large degree on the effectiveness of domestic political institutions and 
macroeconomic policy. Governments need to manage the potential downsides of aid, 
such as Dutch Disease. Statistical analysis of the effect of institutions on development 
produces ambiguous results, because it is difficult to find reasonable exclusion 
restrictions to identify the effect of institutions. Nevertheless, there is a substantial body 
of evidence to suggest that institutions do matter for aid directed at industry. The Dutch 
Disease effect can be offset by good macroeconomic policy to promote competitiveness. 
These comments might apply to a much lesser degree, or not at all, when we look at the 
impact of aid on human capital and human development. This means that while it might 
make sense to restrict aid designed to promote productivity to countries with good 
governance, this argument does not apply when aid is designed to achieve other 
objectives. There is no need for industrialized nations to stop aid aimed at the 
alleviation of household poverty. Even with poor political institutions, it is possible that 
this sort of aid can be delivered with some degree of efficiency, as shown in the results 
summarized in this study. 
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Appendix 1 
Table A1: Summary sample statistics for the development indicators 
Means Assets  Sanitation Education Fertility  Health
quintile 1  0.1595  0.0411 0.3075 6.0625 0.1781
quintile 2  0.2511  0.1054 0.4083 5.3417 0.1682
quintile 3  0.3379  0.1551 0.4974 4.8542 0.1556
quintile 4  0.4481  0.2820 0.6110 4.2646 0.1294
quintile 5  0.6534  0.5277 0.7851 3.2146 0.0876
Standard deviations  Assets Sanitation Education Fertility  Health
quintile 1  0.1175  0.1322 0.2224 1.3731 0.0914
quintile 2  0.1610  0.2289 0.2592 1.4158 0.1013
quintile 3  0.2013  0.2711 0.2691 1.5492 0.1023
quintile 4  0.2250  0.3150 0.2580 1.5444 0.0929
quintile 5  0.1822  0.3109 0.1642 1.1897 0.0582
Source: Fielding et al. (2005).   15
Appendix 2: The structure of the fitted model 
Our dataset includes 48 countries, and in each country we measure five development 
outcomes in five household quintiles. Three of the outcomes (assets, sanitation, 
schooling) are measured on the [0,1] interval, with a substantial number of observations 
close to zero or unity, so these three variables are modelled in Probit form. The other 
two (fertility, mortality) are modelled in log-linear form.15 Let the j
th development 
indicator for the k
th quintile in the n
th country (j = 5, k = 5, n = 48) be denoted yjkn. Then 
our regression equation for the j
th indicator is  
 
yjkn = F(α jk + Σi ≠ j β ij·yikn + Σ p ϕ jp·xnp + θ j·ln(aidn)) + ujkn           (A1) 
for j = (assets, sanitation, schooling) and  
 
ln(yjkn) = α jk + Σi ≠ j β ij·yikn + Σ p ϕ jp·xnp + θ j·ln(aidn) + ujkn     (A2) 
for j = (fertility, mortality).  
 
F(.) is the Normal cumulative density function. xnp is the value of the p
th exogenous 
conditioning variable (listed in Table 4) in the n
th country, and ujkn is a residual. Greek 
letters indicate constant parameters to be estimated. Note that the intercepts of the 
regression equations vary across quintiles, but the slope coefficients do not. (With only 
48 countries, we do not really have enough degrees of freedom for quintile-specific 
regression equations.) Our aid equation is: 
 
ln(aidn)  = αAID + Σ p ϕ AID p ·xnp + θ AID ·ln(discomn) + uAIDn     (A3) 
 
Table A2: Summary of the structure of the model 
  Assets equation Sanitation equation  Health equation
Natural resources  ¶ ¶ 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization  * ¶ 
Size * ** 
Coastline dummy  * ¶  **
Temperature   ¶
Squared temperature    ¶
Malaria   **
  schooling equation fertility equation 
Christian population  ** ** 
Muslim population  * ** 
Source: Fielding et al. (2005). 
 
                                                 
15 Strictly speaking, mortality is also measured on a bounded interval, but no observation is anywhere 
near the upper or lower bound. The sample distributions of fertility and mortality are approximately log-
normal.   16
Identification of the model is achieved through zero restrictions on the ϕ  parameters, as 
indicated in Table 4. The model is a fitted by 3SLS, allowing for non-zero correlations 
between all of the ujkn. The fitted model is over-identified, since the assets, sanitation 
and health equations between them incorporate six instruments; the fitted model passes 
an over-identifying restrictions test. Tests of the significance of individual instruments 
in each equation produce results as follows. One asterisk indicates significance at the 
5 per cent level, two indicate significance at the 1 per cent level; a paragraph mark 
indicates insignificance at the 5 per cent level. 
 
Omission of the insignificant instruments still leaves an over-identified model in which 
the regression coefficients are similar to those in the original model. Given these results, 
we are confident in the overall robustness of our identification structure. 
 
 